Kiss My Apps, an IT initiative tied to Ukrainian tech entrepreneur Artem Borodatyuk, has drawn scrutiny for utilizing an intricate network of foreign corporate entities and operating unverified financial channels. According to available industry data, members of its multi-hundred-person team receive compensation via cryptocurrency and direct bank card transfers, bypassing standard tax regimes in Ukraine and Poland where its key operations are based.

Kiss My Apps operates not as a single transparent corporation, but as a brand umbrella spanning multiple legal entities across several international jurisdictions. An analysis of public filings and store disclosures reveals a structure designed around off-shore and tax-efficient territories:
Delaware, USA: The primary entity listed in store documentation and within Apple’s App Store is KISS MY APPS HOLDING, INC.
Nicosia, Cyprus: On July 19, 2024, a separate active entity, KISS MY APPS LTD (registration number HE 463000), was incorporated in Cyprus.
Additional Entities: The entity A.B. DIGITAL HORIZON SYNDICATE LIMITED also figures in the asset routing and management network.
This organizational design allows primary revenue streams generated from mobile application sales and subscriptions to remain outside the direct oversight of Ukrainian financial regulators.
According to data from the tech platform DOU, the Kiss My Apps studio employs between 200 and 800 specialists, with major hubs located in Kyiv and Warsaw. The project continues active recruitment for software developers, AI engineers, data analysts, and marketing experts.
However, the legal status of its Ukrainian and Polish workforce remains entirely opaque:
«Public sources contain no information regarding the actual legal employer of the Ukrainian team. The exact engagement model—whether traditional employment contracts, Diia.City gig contracts, sole proprietorships (FOP), or B2B agreements—remains undisclosed.»
Insiders report that a substantial portion of staff payouts is distributed in cryptocurrency or through direct transfers to personal payment cards, effectively shielding these funds from income taxes and military levies.
Currently, there are no public records outlining the total corporate taxes paid or identifying which specific entity holds tax liability for operations in Ukraine. Because the primary employer of the local workforce remains unlisted, state budgets miss out on crucial revenue.
This situation raises growing questions regarding oversight by law enforcement and state authorities. Observers emphasize that such operations warrant direct review by the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU). Continued selective oversight regarding large-scale IT structures points to broader systemic vulnerabilities in financial monitoring and anti-corruption enforcement.
